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My thesis is that modern progressive or social-democratic liberal constitutionalism invites economic decline and political polarization, even if it avoids the massive institutional rot that pervades authoritarian regimes. Its key omission is its
conscious decision not to specify the protected individual rights, of which individual
autonomy, private property, and contractual freedom are key. Yet ironically, not one
of these is typically listed in the standard human-rights statutes, which instead focus on three different factors: positive rights to education, health, and housing; overcoming the widening inequality of wealth; and demarcating an ever-larger list of
improper grounds for discrimination. Regrettably, the modern progressive hunt for
social-democratic rights becomes a major source of its own undoing. Indeed, its
wholesale indifference to the classical liberal agenda will tend to close off avenues
for personal and economic advancement, and thus fuel the rise of the dangerous
populism and intolerance on both the left and the right, leading to a decline of respect for the democratic institutions.

INTRODUCTION
Professors Tom Ginsburg, Aziz Huq, and Mila Versteeg
(GHV) have written a mile-a-minute, and decidedly one-sided, account of the decline and fall of liberal constitutionalism throughout the world in the past generation. There is of course much to
lament in the recent trends in world affairs, which have shown as
of late a depressing tendency to reward authoritarian and bankrupt regimes across the globe. Many of the traditional bastions
of liberal constitutionalism have fallen on hard times. Inside the
European Union there are high levels of instability on a variety
of fronts. The repeated monetary crises in the PIIGS—Portugal,
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Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain1—have created endless tensions
with Germany, which has emerged as the dominant financial and
political EU power. Closer to home, the surprising decision of the
United Kingdom to leave the European Union in June 2016 offers
further evidence of the breakdown in the establishment’s dominance. That development was matched by the surprise election of
Donald Trump as president of the United States, which has led to
intense and prolonged clashes between progressives and conservatives. The nonstop gyrations of the Trump administration
on everything from immigration reform to national security to
healthcare give little reason for optimism. And it takes no genius
or learned empirical study to see that the situations on the ground
in China, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Russia, Syria, Turkey, and
Venezuela are surely worse than they were a decade ago, given
the potent mix of political tyranny on the one side and economic
backsliding on the other. Cuba is scarcely any better.
That said, it is important at the very least to draw this simple
distinction: there are places where liberal constitutionalism has
failed because it has never been tried; and there are places where
liberal constitutionalism has failed, or at least has come under
stress, because it has been tried and has been found wanting. In
this short Essay, I will address the latter and ignore the former,
except to say that authoritarian rule is not made more palatable
when dressed up in either constitutional rhetoric or democratic
clothing. But what is critical is that the nub of the problem is that
so-called liberal constitutionalism has little in common with classical liberal constitutions that prioritize the protection of rights
of property and contract. Instead, most liberal constitutions today
allow (but rarely require) governments to offer a broad array of
positive rights to housing, education, and healthcare, which,
given the low level of economic productivity in such regimes, are
better regarded as aspirational rather than strictly enforceable.
Scarce government resources are routinely dissipated by converting competitive markets into monopolistic ones by imposing entry
barriers and regulating wages and prices.
My thesis is that modern progressive or social-democratic
liberal constitutionalism invites economic decline and political
polarization, even if it avoids the massive institutional rot that
pervades authoritarian regimes. Much of the sharp criticism that

1
See Stephen Beard, Eurozone Hopes PIIGS May Fly (Marketplace, Aug 3, 2017),
archived at http://perma.cc/5PMD-T6ZL.
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GHV deliver against Brexit and the Trump administration overlooks the simple point that these protest movements have taken
place in large measure because of the failure of the progressive
and human-rights agenda of liberal constitutionalism that GHV
defend and that I have long opposed.2 In broad strokes, they speak
about the need to protect some unspecified enumeration of individual rights through judicial review, along with commitments to
the rule of law that are intended to cabin the operation of the modern administrative state.3 At one point, this liberal-democratic
synthesis was thought, erroneously, to be so stable that it led
Francis Fukuyama to speak, prematurely it seems, of the “end of
history,” because “there are no serious ideological competitors left
to liberal democracy.”4 In this optimistic scenario, one authoritative and stable institutional equilibrium is believed to work for a
diverse range of nations with vastly different ethnicities, geographies, economies, histories, political traditions, and religions.
Given the large differences among the types of states that
need some workable constitutional order, any ostensible claim for
universality on matters of structure should be suspect on its face.
This is particularly true with respect to the structural features of
any constitution. GHV are clearly right to note that the usual list
of protective devices—federalism, separation of powers, judicial
review, and electoral reform—do not offer, either alone or in combination, a magic bullet that will solve political ills of complex
modern societies.5 Federalism cannot work in many small countries for the simple reason that subunits are extremely difficult to
create and maintain unless there is already some strong territorial division in place prior to the formation of the federation, as in
Switzerland. It did, after a fashion, work with the separation of
India from Pakistan in 1947 and the division of Ireland into
Northern Ireland, which remained with the United Kingdom,
and Ireland, which has remained independent since 1921. More
specifically, nations with strong religious divisions may need, if
separation is not an option, elaborate structural constraints to

2
For one of many such accounts, see generally Richard A. Epstein, How Progressives Rewrote the Constitution (Cato 2006) (detailing how progressivism undermined the
Framers’ vision of limited federal powers).
3
See generally Tom Ginsburg, Aziz Huq, and Mila Versteeg, The Coming Demise of
Liberal Constitutionalism?, 85 U Chi L Rev 239 (2018).
4
Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man 211 (Free Press 1992),
quoted in Ginsburg, Huq, and Versteeg, 85 U Chi L Rev at 240 n 3 (cited in note 3).
5
See Ginsburg, Huq, and Versteeg, 85 U Chi L Rev at 248–49 (cited in note 3).

406

The University of Chicago Law Review

[85:403

prevent them from being ripped apart by internal strife, as happened in Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria.
In this Essay, however, I put structural issues to one side.
Instead, I want to address what I regard as the key omission in
their formulation of liberal democracy—namely, their conscious
decision not to specify the protected individual rights. To my
mind, the key building blocks of any free society begin with the
acceptance of notions of individual autonomy, private property,
and contractual freedom, none of which GHV mention by name,
and none of which is typically listed in the standard human-rights
statutes, which tend to worry much more about creating positive
rights to education, health, and housing; overcoming the widening inequality of wealth; and demarcating an ever-larger list of
improper grounds for discrimination. In my view, the modern progressive hunt for social-democratic rights embedded in the supposed liberal constitution is a major source of its own undoing.
Indeed, this wholesale indifference to the classical liberal agenda,
with its effort to expand, not foreclose, opportunities for personal
and economic advancement, has much to do with the rise of populism on both the left and the right, as well as the decline of
respect for the democratic institutions and practices that GHV
detailed in their Essay. In Part I of this Essay, I briefly set out
what I regard as the fundamentals of a sound constitutional
order. In Part II, I explain why the rejection of this agenda has
led to the effort to find scapegoats for the economic stagnation and
political resentments attributable to the central tenets of liberal
constitutionalism.
I. BACK TO FUNDAMENTALS
The familiar rights of personal autonomy, private property,
and contractual freedom form the starting point of any sound
social structure. These key notions are not a set of absolutes that
must always be respected, come what may. But by the same token, these rights are sufficiently central that they should not be
overridden for weak or overtly political reasons.
In brief, the basic argument runs as follows. As a matter of
general economic theory, the best way to maximize human welfare writ large is to first limit the use of force and fraud and then
to encourage and foster cooperation and competition in the markets for goods, services, and ideas. This last element applies not
only to profit-making activities, but also to the full range of religious, social, and charitable activities. Force and competition in
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all of these areas are polar opposites for this simple reason: force
is a negative-sum game; in contrast, cooperation and competition
are positive-sum games. Increase the number of players in a competitive market—players whose only weapons are offers of superior goods, lower prices, better terms, and greater personal and
spiritual satisfaction—and the overall level of social welfare goes
up. Increase the number of persons who are free to use force and
fraud at will, and life itself becomes “solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.”6 It is hard to imagine any successful normative
order that does not put the control of aggression and the protection of cooperative and competitive behavior at the top of the list
of collective social obligations. The common protectionist response
to protect some groups by tariffs only hurts others, and it also
removes the important external check on the weaknesses of the
domestic market, which shrinks under the weight of its own entry
barriers and transfer payments, all too easily leading to an
“America First” attitude that cuts out international trade and
cooperation.
In order to achieve that objective, it is necessary to adopt a
two-part agenda. First, it is necessary to develop rules that control not only the use of force but its close relatives, such as the
setting of traps and the using of poison. It also becomes important
to understand that each individual is both an autonomous agent
who is responsible for his or her own actions and one who is entitled to reap the gains that come from the acquisition of property
and the creation of successful contractual and social relations.
The respect of these rights is a vast improvement over any social
or pre-social order that imposes no limits on aggressive forms of
human behavior. This control thus represents a decisive first step
out of a state of nature, both historically and normatively, which
is why these rules have been, since Roman times, said to be based
on a natural law that applied across time and across nations.7 It

6
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 89 (Cambridge 1991) (Richard Tuck, ed) (originally
published 1651).
7
See Gaius, The Institutes of Gaius: Part I bk I, § 1 (Clarendon 1946) (Francis de
Zulueta, ed). This theme is picked up in Joseph Story, Natural Law, in Francis Lieber, ed,
2 Encyclopedia Americana 151 (1844):

We call those rights natural, which belong to all mankind, and result from our
very nature and condition; such are a man’s right to his life, limbs and liberty,
to the produce of his personal labor, at least to the extent of his present wants,
and to the use, in common with the rest of mankind, of air, light, water, and the
common means of subsistence.
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may well be that there are complex differences in structural protections across the globe, but the set of fundamental individual
rights exhibits far less variation, such that, comparatively, most
of the different variations that one sees across systems reflect difficult substantive choices that cause as much difficulty within
systems as across them.8
This set of natural rights functions only as an initial baseline
from which further gains are possible, both by voluntary private
contract and public action. The former is easy enough to understand. Any private voluntary transaction generates mutual gains
for the parties, for otherwise, why enter into it? More importantly,
as a general matter the externalities from trade are positive for
third persons, except in a few cases (conspiracies to kill or steal,
or to restrain trade, which are accordingly proscribed). But in addition to these contract rules, there are at least four key areas in
which private property rights may be appropriately limited. The
first is that the rules of occupation that work for the original acquisition of land, animals, and chattels do not work for rivers and
beaches, where the basic formulation of property rights is inverted: these are ius communes, common resources from which
everyone has the right not to be excluded, given their necessity
for human communication and transportation.9 There is no credible argument that the right of a single person to dam a river and
bottle the water produces enough social gain to outweigh the result that water no longer moves in its customary path.10 Second,
the presumptive exclusivity of private property can be breached
under conditions of necessity, defined as those involving an imminent loss to person or property. Third, social order requires centralized resources, so it is perfectly acceptable to tax individuals
on their labor and property in order to provide for the common
defense, the preservation of internal order, and needed social infrastructure. But at the same time, it is critical to curb abusive
transfers from taxation, such that in a classical liberal society the
ends for taxation are largely limited to the provision of public
goods. In addition, the source of taxation extends over a broad

8
For a nice demonstration in connection with the tension between the original
owner and the bona fide purchaser, see generally Saul Levmore, Variety and Uniformity
in the Treatment of the Good-Faith Purchaser, 16 J Legal Stud 43 (1987).
9
See Justinian, The Institutes of Justinian bk 1, title II, ¶ 1 (Oxford 4th ed 1906)
(J.B. Moyle, trans).
10 See Richard A. Epstein, Property Rights in Water, Spectrum, and Minerals, 86 U
Colo L Rev 389, 399–400 (2015).
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base of labor and property transactions, preferably through a flat
tax on either consumption or income.11 (I prefer the former.)
Fourth, while the state may condemn private property, the eminent domain power should be exercised sparingly and only for the
acquisition of particular properties needed to supply public functions, and only upon payment of just compensation equal to the
value of the property to its private owner, plus compensation for
the consequential damages from the taking. These rules allow
governments to operate when they are needed, but to constrain
public officials from singling out friends for special favors and
enemies for special burdens, thereby constraining the famous
rent-seeking problem that leads to faction and discord in modern
western democracies that have abandoned these principles.12
Given these strong rights considerations, structural protections have a far greater chance of success than do the delineation
of rights implicit in the modern theories of liberal constitutionalism, which regard all of these substantive constraints as nettlesome interferences with the rights of government to advance
some general benevolent conception of society writ large, often as
determined by experts responding to some general democratic
command.13 One familiar example of liberal constitutionalism is
to supply each person with a minimum level of social security, as
with the American Social Security system—the choice of name is
a matter of political brilliance—that guarantees some minimum
standard of support that goes well beyond the protection of all
individuals from aggression by others. Even small-government
thinkers like F.A. Hayek, writing less than a decade after Social
Security was established, spoke of two kinds of security, which
“are, first, security against severe physical privation, the certainty of a given minimum of sustenance for all; and, second, the

11 See Richard A. Epstein, We Need a Real Flat Tax (Hoover Institution, Oct 13,
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/5GXW-864L:

The flat tax . . . offers the most attractive option, because it allows the government to set the overall levels of revenue as high or as low as seems necessary,
without inviting various factions to game the system for partisan advantage.
The flat tax also tends to reduce the overall tax burden, because people are on
average more reluctant to raise taxes on others if they have to raise them on
themselves.
12 For the classic statement, see generally James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The
Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (Michigan 1962).
13 For an early defense of the administrative state written just after the American
constitutional revolution of 1937, see James Landis, The Administrative Process 46
(Greenwood 1938).
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security of a given standard of life, or of the relative position
which one person or group enjoys compared with others.”14
In practice, however, this distinction is only one of degree.
The sharper difference is between providing protection against
the aggression of others and offering any positive state benefits.
The classical liberal theory kept to this line, and sought, with
some serious success, to handle the question of minimum security, as Justice Joseph Story wrote, through “imperfect” obligations of benevolence, in contrast to the perfect rights to liberty
and property, that are required as a matter of conscience and of
social convention for people to aid those in need, as by tithing or
charitable constitution.15 The difference between these two approaches is enormous, because there is far less room for slippage
under the classical liberal conception as articulated by Story than
under the Hayekian view, in which the social minimums can,
and have, creep up for all sorts of reasons, as with Medicare and
Medicaid in the American context.
From the guarded Hayekian position, it is easy to observe the
slippage to a more robust version of positive rights that covers
health care and unemployment insurance.16 Most modern writers
do not have Hayek’s obvious ambivalence toward the creation of
these positive rights.17 So in most progressive circles, the class of
affirmative rights goes far further, weakening the protection of
property rights by allowing politically motivated legislatures to
redistribute property and opportunity among its citizens. It is not
possible here to give a full account of how this transformation of
rights theory emerged, but it is useful to pick up on a key element
that passes without complaint from GHV, who take it for granted
that a liberal constitutional order protects “the right to unionize,”
without stressing what correlative duties individuals have with
regard to this newly asserted right and why.18 That right is of
course found, along with other positive rights, in the UN Universal

14

F.A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom 133 (Chicago 1944).
See Story, Natural Law at 151 (cited in note 7) (emphasis omitted). Note that his
treatment is heavily theistic and does not offer any theoretical grounding for rules that
have in fact huge functional advantages.
16 For my criticism of Hayek on these grounds, see Richard A. Epstein, Hayekian
Socialism, 58 Md L Rev 271, 298–99 (1999).
17 See generally, for example, Cass R. Sunstein, The Second Bill of Rights: FDR’s
Unfinished Revolution and Why We Need It More Than Ever (Basic Books 2004).
18 Ginsburg, Huq, and Versteeg, 85 U Chi L Rev at 251 (cited in note 3).
15
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Declaration of Human Rights.19 In ambition, the UN delineation
matches the parallel claims for universality of the natural law.
But in its content it is far more dangerous, as it contains the seeds
for the breakdown of the liberal-democratic order.
It is easy to see how an impasse can arise if the UN declaration (and similar pronouncements) sets the ground rules for
employment relations. The Trade Disputes Act of 190620 led to
massive distortion of labor markets that, before Margaret
Thatcher became prime minister, severely retarded labor-market
growth. The National Labor Relations Act21 (NLRA) in the United
States had less dire consequences, but it allowed the strike wave
in the aftermath of World War II to create profound labor-market
dislocations that were only partially negated by the passage of the
Taft-Hartley Act22 in 1947. The UN declaration does not specify
whom the correlative duties fall on, what they are, and why they
are imposed. There are no obvious limits on what can be done
under this framework, and in the labor markets, this result can
easily lead to a system in which jobs become so protected that
dismissal, if it is obtainable at all, requires compliance with onerous administrative procedures, in contrast to the common-law
rule that allows people to enter into contracts at will, and with
respect to all future services an employee may quit and an employer may fire for good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all.
The breakdown in European labor markets stems from just

19 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UN General Assembly (Dec 10, 1948),
UN Doc A/RES/217A 75:

Article 23
1. Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favorable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.
2. Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal
work.
3. Everyone who works has the right to just and favorable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection.
4. Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of
his interests.
20 6 Edw 7 ch 47, reprinted in 44 The Public General Statutes 246 (Eyre &
Spottiswoode 1906).
21 49 Stat 449 (1935), codified as amended at 29 USC § 151 et seq.
22 Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 Stat 136, codified at 29 USC
§§ 141–87.
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these restrictions, which among their many vices create a privileged in-class that cannot be dislodged, necessarily leaving scant
opportunities for those who are shut out of the market.23
These dangerous developments stand in sharp contrast with
classical natural-rights theory, in which private property imposes
on all individuals the duty to forbear from entering or destroying
it, regardless of their wealth or social status. These traditional
rights are largely invariant to three key elements: the size of the
population, the change in overall wealth, and changes in technology.24 This set of rights is easily knowable and enforceable, and it
does not suffer from uncertain transitions and redefinitions that
are part and parcel of the modern administrative state, for which
tinkering with statutory commands is a daily part of the overall
vision.
Wholly apart from its indefinite structure, the modern version of positive rights for workers omits any explicit (or indeed
implicit) reference to the simple proposition that unions seek to
raise wages by exercising monopoly power over the labor markets
of which they are a part, for which at one time they were subject
by the Supreme Court to the antitrust laws in the United States.25
But that legal regime did not last. Unions received immunity from
the operation of the antitrust laws under the Trade Disputes Act
in England of 190626 and under § 6 of the Clayton Act.27 To make

23 See Elena Holodny, This Chart Highlights One of Europe’s Biggest Problems
(Business Insider, Nov 9, 2017), online at http://www.businessinsider.com/youth
-unemployment-europe-eu-2017-11 (visited Jan 23, 2018) (Perma archive unavailable)
(comparing Europe’s overall unemployment rate of 8.9 percent to the unemployment rate
for youth ages 15 to 24 of 18.7 percent as of September 2017).
24 For discussion, see Richard A. Epstein, Design for Liberty: Private Property, Public
Administration, and the Rule of Law 73–76 (Harvard 2011).
25 See Loewe v Lawlor, 208 US 274, 306–09 (1908). Loewe was part of a consistent
intellectual order, which included such decisions as Adair v United States, 208 US 161,
180 (1908) (striking down a federal collective bargaining law); Coppage v Kansas, 236 US
1, 26 (1915) (striking down a state collective bargaining law); Hitchman Coal & Coke Co v
Mitchell, 245 US 229, 261–62 (1917) (finding that inducement of breach of contract lies
against unions). For my unrepentant defense of the old order, see generally Richard A.
Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal Labor Legislation, 92 Yale L J 1357 (1983).
26 6 Edw 7 ch 47 § 4, reprinted in 44 The Public General Statutes at 246–47 (cited in
note 20).
27 38 Stat 730, 731 (1914), codified as amended at 15 USC § 17:

The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing
contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and
operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for the
purposes of mutual help, and not having capital stock or conducted for profit, or
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the point more broadly, the overgeneralized vision of liberal democracy grants full legitimacy to those states that foster and protect monopoly power in some areas while denying it in others, and
thus allows radically different rules to apply to concentration of
power by firms and unions. In the United States, the adoption of
the NLRA in 1935 led to a massive strike wave after the end of
the Second World War,28 which in turn led to legislation—the
Administrative Procedure Act29 and the Taft-Hartley Act—that
tempered the force of union power so that it did not lead to the
breakdown of the state. But England was not so lucky, for the
labor market almost broke the country when Margaret Thatcher
became prime minister.30 There is no way that any liberal democracy can hope to prosper if it turns over that level of monopoly power to one of its groups. What happened in England in
1980 is happening again today: the success or failure of President
Emmanuel Macron’s new French government will turn on
whether he is able to reform the rigid labor laws by making it
easier to hire and fire.31
Today, in many markets, unions are not the main source of
dislocation, but other systems of regulation, minimum wages,
maximum hours, family leave, required healthcare coverage, and
antidiscrimination laws contribute to labor-market rigidity that
liberal constitutionalists tend to ignore, just as they ignore the
powerful empirical evidence that the period of greatest prosperity
and economic growth—roughly speaking, 1870 to 1940 in the
United States32—corresponded perfectly with the classical liberal
constitutional order that has always attracted the scorn of liberal
constitutionalists, which includes not only progressives but also
many traditional conservatives who continue to think that

to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the
members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies
in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws.
28 See midtowng, The Great Strike Wave of 1946 (Economic Populist, Apr 5, 2009),
archived at http://perma.cc/W3WU-SCPP.
29 60 Stat 237 (1946), codified as amended in various sections of Title 5.
30 See Adam Taylor, Margaret Thatcher Fought One Huge Battle That Changed the
UK Forever (Business Insider, Apr 8, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc//6NT2-GVHT.
31 For a discussion of the issue, see Chloe Farand, Emmanuel Macron Kicks Off Controversial Attempt to Reform France’s Labour Laws (The Independent, June 28, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/RD94-FV76.
32 For the empirical evidence, see Robert Gordon, The Rise and Fall of American
Growth 25–318 (Princeton 2016).
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Lochner v New York33 was an unmitigated constitutional disaster.34 Tellingly, the word “growth” never appears in GHV’s account of liberal constitutionalism. And yet it is precisely the lack
of growth, combined with the manifest rise of the political corruption in a large state, that has led to widespread disenchantment
in both the United States and the European Union. Nor should
these developments come as any surprise. When times are bad,
groups look at the jobs that are lost and hope for some protectionist maneuver to shield them from foreign shocks. But in virtually
all cases, the gains from free trade across national borders will, if
allowed to flourish, swamp these parochial maneuvers, at least if
it can overcome a broadscale consensus that includes in the
United States such notables as President Trump, Hillary Clinton,
and Senator Bernie Sanders, and of course union groups that see
free trade as the mortal enemy of their monopoly wages.
On this issue, there should be a powerful litmus test that
rules these protectionist motives out of bounds. To be sure, there
are always cases in which restriction on the import or export of
goods may well be justified.35 Excluding toxic goods is perfectly
acceptable so long as it is not a ruse for protectionist activities.
But abuse of this principle is rampant, as when the European
Union invokes the precautionary principle to impose strict restrictions on GMOs,36 notwithstanding a complete lack of evidence that they are harmful. Similarly, requiring export licenses
for advanced goods with clear implications for national security is
yet another important exception to the general rule. However,
most such restrictions are intended to secure advantages for local
producers, but can do so only at the expense of local consumers
and local manufacturers who need to import goods and services
from overseas in order to remain competitive as sellers of goods
and providers of services in both domestic and international markets. GHV’s definition of liberal constitutionalism is consistent
with strongly anti-free-trade positions precisely because it makes
no substantive commitments on individual rights, and thus opens
33

198 US 45 (1905).
See, for example, Obergefell v Hodges, 135 S Ct 2584, 2621 (2015) (Roberts dissenting) (referring to “the debacle of the Lochner era”). For a rather different account, see
David E. Bernstein, Rehabilitating Lochner: Defending Individual Rights against Progressive Reform 8–39 (Chicago 2011).
35 For a good treatment of these issues, see General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Art XX, 55 UNTS 194, 262–63, TIAS 1700 (1947) (GATT).
36 Theresa Papademetriou, Restrictions on Genetically Modified Organisms: European
Union (Library of Congress, March 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/WG3D-CSG5.
34
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the way for the advancement of the wrong rights, like those in the
UN declaration, that create extensive cross subsidies, restraints
on entry, and other forms of monopoly power.
A similar difficulty arises in connection with the knotty question of redistribution of wealth through state action. It is difficult,
even within the framework of classical liberalism, to argue that
any system of redistribution should be banned as a matter of first
principle, given the case for at least a set of imperfect obligations. But it is important to note that one of the great difficulties
of modern social life stems from the size of the redistributive state
insofar as it provides massive subsidies for pensions, healthcare,
education, and housing that are not supportable by resources
available to the public. Yet it is important to note that there are
some important ways to curb the strong appetite for these subsidies even when they are state provided.
First, it is always a mistake to fund various transfer payments from specific taxes on unrelated businesses or industries.
One recent American example of that practice was the excise tax
imposed on medical devices under Obamacare, suspended for two
years, which imposed huge costs on one particular industry.37 The
invariable rule in these cases is that welfare benefits should come
from general revenues so that their cost is brought to bear, however imperfectly, by the parties who support the program. The use
of general revenues thus helps steady the political game of intrigue that arises when all interest groups seek to duck potential
liabilities with the same enthusiasm that they seek to attract special benefits. But even here, so long as there are no constraints on
the objects for which taxes can be spent, huge transfers, as
through pension programs, can negate many of these benefits. It
is a sobering reminder that a state like Illinois has both huge unfunded pension liabilities and a flat state income tax.38
Second, it is never proper to seek to raise moneys for these
programs by making an aggressive use of governmental powers
to license or permit. One of many examples is the requirement
that the builders of new properties for sale or lease agree to reserve some fraction of their new supply for affordable residences.
The conceit is that they can always make up the difference by
37 Medical Device Tax Suspended for Two Years (AAMI, Dec 21, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/RY2H-M84U.
38 For the juxtaposition, see Mike Klemens and Ralph Martire, Illinois Issues: Flat
vs. Graduated Income Tax (NPR Illinois, Aug 24, 2017), archived at
http://www.perma.cc/G6WJ-HDCR.
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raising the price on the market-rate units in the mix. The reality
is that the burden on sales and rentals operates like an indirect
form of price control that reduces the private willingness to invest
in the first place, leading to systematic housing shortages, which
become especially acute when the rates are set too high for businesses to continue. A similar risk arises in the United States in
connection with the Community Reinvestment Act of 197739
(CRA) and similar programs that insist that large subsidies be
poured into underserved neighborhoods for banks that wish to expand their operations by opening branches or acquiring local
banks.40 These obligations clearly spilled over into lending markets, in which it was, and is, impossible to expand high-risk loans
without impairing the safety and security of the member banks.41
These pressures (along with the lack of appreciation of correlated
risks) helped bring about the collapse of the mortgage market in
2007 and 2008, which once again affirms the importance of imposing some strong constraint on redistributive politics. The monetary consequences of off-budget changes are not made explicit
until it is too late. Yet the standard model of liberal constitutionalism has nothing to say in opposition to that practice.
It might well be said that these examples are all too anecdotal, and in a sense they are. But within the United States the evidence from competitive federalism supports the same point by
looking at the aggregate impact of taxation and regulation on individual behavior, here in the context of the movement of populations across state lines. On this matter, there is no contest: the
migration moves from high-tax, high-regulation states to low-tax,
low-regulation states. One recent study notes that the outmigration from high-tax, high-regulation states virtually matches the
in-migration to low-tax states—the bottom ten states have lost
about 3.78 million people over the last decade, while the top ten
have gained about 3.75 million.42 The differences are all the more
impressive because both groups of states have to struggle with

39

Pub L No 95-128, 91 Stat 1147, codified at 12 USC § 2901 et seq.
For a critique, see Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, The Community
Reinvestment Act: An Economic Analysis, 79 Va L Rev 291, 294–97 (1993) (arguing that
the Act does “more harm than good”).
41 For an analysis of the impact of the CRA, see Sumit Agarwal, et al, Did the Community
Reinvestment Act (CRA) Lead to Risky Lending? *21 (National Bureau of Economic
Research Working Paper 18609, Dec 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/DQM3-4T54.
42 See Jonathan Williams, Business-Friendly States Are Growing at the Expense of
Those That Tax and Spend (National Review, Apr 22, 2017), archived at
http://perma.cc/FAM4-8VJ3.
40
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the same large system of federal regulation, so that the differences in total impact are smaller than those that would arise if
the only determinant of economic success were the state regulation. It is not possible to present more exhaustive data here, but
it is possible to insist that the flaw in modern liberal constitutionalism lies in this compound failure: it first shrinks the economic
base, then increases the transfer payments that it runs on that
base. The point here is not that maximum productivity and zero
redistribution are the ideal mix. Nor is it that all states must fall
from grace if they make any concession on either margin. It is
rather that there is likely to be a continuum in practices, such
that the cumulative impact of increases in regulation, taxation,
and transfer payments carries economic risks that the defenders
of liberal constitutionalism tend to overlook. And make no mistake
about it, the decline of economic growth carries with it major opportunities for political instability, an issue to which I now turn.
II. FINDING SCAPEGOATS
There are then good reasons to be pessimistic about the future of liberal constitutionalism in the face of rising populism. But
in light of the above analysis it is necessary to recognize why so
many of the populist forces are strongly opposed to the system,
given its defense of the wrong right. In this regard, it is important
to comment on one particular passage, which contains in my view
some truth but much error about the behavior of the opponents of
that system. That passage reads in full:
By the end of 2016, however, it was not merely possible, but
even en vogue for aspiring politicians to question the hegemony of liberal democracy. Although warning signs aplenty
might now be discerned, it is possible to single out the June
2016 Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom and the
November 2016 presidential election in the United States as
marking, in different ways, globally resonant repudiations of
the liberal-democratic norm.
In both contests, right-of-center populist positions hostile
to international migration, international and supranational
organizations, and the liberal tolerance of different ethnicities and faiths prevailed. Their triumphs were part of a
wider, right-leaning “populist explosion” in Europe and Asia,
albeit one that trails an earlier left-leaning populist shift in
Latin America. Although they have typically ascended to
power via democratic, electoral means, populists on both the
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left and right have departed from liberal-democratic norms
in several ways.43
I am not sure whether GHV would have written this passage
in exactly the same way today. But I take strong exception to the
claim that Brexit has unleashed strongly antidemocratic and intolerant forces. The vote itself was very close—less than four
points separated the two sides—which makes perfectly good
sense because the case was close: there are advantages in remaining in the European Union as part of a free-trade zone, but less
insofar as it operates as a central government capable of issuing
binding law on its member nations.44 Anyone who has followed
Prime Minister Theresa May knows that she has tried to preserve
cooperative relations with the European Union, by endorsing
three of its four critical freedoms: the free movement of capital,
goods, and services. Even though the UK decision to leave the
European Union was irrevocable, the United Kingdom hoped to
preserve “the deep and special partnership” as the European
Union’s “closest friend and neighbour.”45 The movement of people
within the European Union raises far more complex issues, but is
orthogonal to the explosive issue of immigration and refugees,
which under the EU agreements is left for individual member
states to decide for themselves.46 The UK motivations for pulling
out of the European Union were mixed, but high on that list was
the belief that the European Union trampled on sensible British
parliamentary autonomy.47 Much sovereign power was transferred to the European Commission, a remote and unsympathetic
body that was all too keen on intervening in the United Kingdom’s
affairs.48

43 Ginsburg, Huq, and Versteeg, 85 U Chi L Rev at 240–41 (citations omitted) (cited
in note 3).
44 For my views, see generally Richard A. Epstein, The Role of Exit Rights: What
the Theory of the Firm Says about the Conduct of Brexit Negotiations, 39 Cardozo L Rev
(forthcoming 2018).
45 Theresa May, Prime Minister’s Letter to Donald Tusk Triggering Article 50
(gov.uk, Mar 29, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/N28X-6S4S.
46 Explaining the Rules (European Commission, June 12, 2016), archived at
http://perma.cc/YX9K-KWPR.
47 See Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, Brexit Vote Is about the Supremacy of Parliament
and Nothing Else: Why I Am Voting to Leave the EU (The Telegraph, June 13, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/25TZ-GYWV.
48 Joshua Rozenberg, Does the EU Impact on UK Sovereignty? (BBC, Feb 23, 2016),
archived at http://perma.cc/QKU7-RMPT.
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Next, the Brexiters chafed at the United Kingdom’s inability
to enter into free-trade agreements with non-EU members, including the United States, Australia, and other parts of the British
Commonwealth.49 Brexiters have no objection to remaining in the
World Trade Organization, whose rules will govern the relationship between the European Union and the United Kingdom if no
separation arrangement is concluded under the Article 50 framework before the clock runs out on March 29, 2019.50 The extent
to which EU regulation bears major responsibility for the
United Kingdom’s own problems is an open question. Indeed,
many Remainers believe that access to European markets are
well worth the regulatory burdens that might be imposed. Yet at
the same time, many Remainers were left-wing Labour Party
members under the leadership of Jeremy Corbyn. His political
star rose after May frittered away her legislative majority.51 It is
also worth noting that leading voices inside the European Union,
most notably that of Michel Barnier, its chief negotiator, have to
date shown little willingness to address new treaty relationships
going forward until the United Kingdom satisfies its debts to the
European Union on key matters of budget commitments, pension
liabilities, loan guarantees, and EU spending on UK projects.52
Barnier puts that figure at the tidy sum of €60 billion (£51 billion).53 It is a grotesque overstatement to claim that Brexiters are
closet supporters of Carl Schmitt, driven by their desire to wipe
out their enemies by physical force if necessary.54 Indeed, the
success or failure of Brexit will depend on whether and how the
European Union and United Kingdom negotiate some follow-on
deal.

49 See Peter Lilley, The Truth about Britain’s Trade outside the European Union (The
Telegraph, May 26, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/8DWZ-DNE8.
50 See Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union Art 50, 55 J EU C326
13, 43–44 (2012).
51 See John Curtice, Theresa May Failed to Gain a Majority Because She Grossly
Misunderstood the ‘Will of the People’ (The Independent, June 9, 2017), archived at
http://perma.cc/2JMP-NVL6.
52 See Michel Barnier, The Conditions for Reaching an Agreement in the Negotiations
with the United Kingdom (European Commission, Mar 22, 2017), archived at
http://perma.cc/BPA9-T9QQ.
53 See Will Martin, The EU Expects to Spend a Massive Chunk of the Article 50 Period
Negotiating a Single Element of Brexit (Business Insider, Feb 20, 2017), archived at
http://perma.cc/LC9V-36SD.
54 See Ginsburg, Huq, and Versteeg, 85 U Chi L Rev at 241 (cited in note 3).
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President Trump is always more difficult to analyze. To say
that he is a divisive force is to understate the obvious. It was appropriate to wince at his jingoistic “America First” inaugural address and his indefensible first order on the entry of noncitizens
into the United States, both of which led me to call at the time for
his resignation.55 After relative quiescence on this issue, his “hire
American and buy American”56 line is a form of protectionist folly
that has to be opposed every step of the way. His now-futile efforts
to tie up the entire budget process until he got funding for his
Mexico wall makes many people, myself included, pine for a
Republican administration headed by Vice President Mike Pence.
Finally, his endless personal indiscretions, abusive and mindless
tweets, nasty insults, and other erratic behaviors make him less
than an ideal presidential figure.
Yet it is a mistake to ignore the positive side of the ledger.
Trump has appointed many highly competent people—think
National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster. On the political front,
Trump has done many things that are right, including allowing
the construction of the Keystone XL and Dakota Access pipelines.
He did so in ways that corrected the legal shenanigans of the
Obama administration, especially on Dakota Access (a case in
which I worked as a consultant for a consortium of labor and business groups supporting the pipeline). At times the Obama administration took actions that were a massive affront to the most
rudimentary requirements of the rule of law, including its unprecedented government refusal to enforce a judgment in their favor
that had been issued by Obama-appointed district-court judge
James Boasberg after painstaking deliberations.57 Thereafter the
assistant secretary in the Department of the Army refused to
issue the necessary permit for an easement over a small tract of
government land, even after the Air Corps of Engineers had found

55 See Richard A. Epstein, Trump’s Immigration Insanity (Hoover Institution, Jan
30, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/7XY8-P78V.
56 See Connor DiGregorio, Buy American, Hire American: How Renewed Protectionism Is Reshaping Supply Chains (Industry Week, Sept 13, 2017), archived at
http://perma.cc/85WM-YDFQ.
57 See Richard Epstein, Why the DOJ Order to Shut Down Construction on the DAPL
Pipeline Is Legally Indefensible (Forbes, Sept 14, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/AAR2
-W7KB; Richard Epstein, Lawless Bureaucratic Obstruction Is No Substitute for the Rule
of Law in the Dakota Access Decision (Forbes, Dec 9, 2016), archived at
http://perma.cc/C9VE-99S4; Richard Epstein, Trump’s Big Move on Dakota Access Pipeline
(Forbes, Jan 26, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/6EWG-29WN.
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that the easement met all regulatory standards.58 Trump was also
right in my view to pull out of the ill-conceived Paris accords.59 On
the international front Trump has, at least for the moment, come
around to the view that we should take at least some modest steps
to stop the carnage in Syria, and, hard as it is, reaffirm the importance of NATO and drop charges of currency manipulation
against the Chinese in order to get some leverage over them with
respect to North Korea.60 The man is too difficult to capture in a
broad denunciation that lacks any bill of particulars.
Finally, GHV misunderstand much of the support of Trump
just as they misunderstand the appeal of Brexit. Trump’s support
was nourished by a widespread hostility, if not downright revulsion, toward Hillary Clinton, his rival. She had the support of the
fashionable eastern elites and was solidly progressive on every
issue from race to campaign finance to taxes to crime. Yet her
natural base was wary of her because of her involvement in
Whitewater, Travelgate, Benghazi, and of course the multiple issues surrounding her email server and former FBI Director
James Comey’s hot-and-cold investigation of her behavior. At
the same time, Clinton alienated massive numbers of people in
flyover country by calling Trump supporters “deplorables” and refusing to acknowledge the enormous economic reversals that hit
people in these less privileged places.61 Nor do GHV make any
reference to the excesses of Black Lives Matter, the shrill invectives of Senator Sanders, or the left-wing protestors who have
managed in short order to disinvite or shout down people like

58 See Courtney Kube and Daniel A. Medina, Army Corps of Engineers Had Actually
Recommended Dakota Access Pipeline Route Approval (NBC News, Dec 7, 2016), archived
at http://perma.cc/4UA7-248Z.
59 See Richard A. Epstein, Forget the Paris Accords (Hoover Institution, May 30,
2017), archived at http://perma.cc/YX9Z-TSQ9.
60 See Stephen Collinson, Trump’s Stunning U-turns on NATO, China, Russia and
Syria (CNN Politics, Apr 13, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/B8TW-JH25.
61 See Amy Chozick, Hillary Clinton Calls Many Trump Backers ‘Deplorables,’ and
G.O.P.
Pounces
(NY
Times,
Sept
10,
2016),
online
at
http://www
.nytimes.com/2016/09/11/us/politics/hillary-clinton-basket-of-deplorables.html?mcubz=0
(visited Oct 18, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable).
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Ayaan Hirsi Ali,62 Heather McDonald,63 Charles Murray,64 and the
vile Milo Yiannopoulos.65 In the United States at least, no one
should overlook the dangers of political extremism from the left
as well as from the right. Put that package together and much of
the Trump appeal was a refusal to accept the status quo of the
modern progressive administrative state that embraces liberal
constitutionalism.
Yet in many ways the most troubling message of GHV’s piece
is their relative indifference to the atrocities that have routinely
taken place in socialist countries like China, Cuba, Russia, and
Venezuela, which dwarf by orders of magnitude any supposed
sins of the Brexiters or even Trump. These socialist havens feature one-man arbitrary rule that is quite willing to jail and torture dissenters, rig presidential elections, and drive an economy
to ruin. I quite agree with GHV that peaceful mass demonstrations may well be the best way to take after corrupt governments.66 And one should not look with indifference at the concerted long-term effort of the Chinese government to reduce the
level of political and cultural independence in Hong Kong, where
massive demonstrations have yet to stop the apparatchiks in
Beijing from squeezing the life out of the region.67 Nor do they
show much worry about the decision of the Russian autocrat
Vladimir Putin to gobble up Crimea.68 Perspective really matters,
and the ostensible enemies of liberal constitutionalism in the
West are child’s play compared to the oppression, intolerance, and
62 See Jason Linkins, Brandeis University’s Decision to Cancel Ayaan Hirsi Ali Appearance Has Done Liberals No Favors (Huffington Post, Apr 20, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/6ZJK-KEQ2.
63 See Cleve R. Wootson Jr, She Wanted to Criticize Black Lives Matter in a College
Speech. A Protest Shut Her Down. (Wash Post, Apr 10, 2017), archived at
http://perma.cc/4X3L-3X6S.
64 See Peter Beinart, A Violent Attack on Free Speech at Middlebury (The Atlantic,
Mar 6, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/YX8U-U3VX.
65 See James Doubek, Breitbart Editor’s Event Canceled as Protests Turn Violent at
UC Berkeley (NPR, Feb 2, 2017), online at http://www.npr.org/sections/
thetwo-way/2017/02/02/512992000/breitbart-editors-event-canceled-as-protests-turn
-violent-at-uc-berkeley (visited Oct 10, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable).
66 See Ginsburg, Huq, and Versteeg, 85 U Chi L Rev at 252–53 (cited in note 3).
67 See John Lyons, China’s Xi Promises to Protect Hong Kong’s Status as Beijing
Tightens Grip (Wall St J, June 29, 2017), online at http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-xi
-promises-to-protect-hong-kongs-status-as-beijing-tightens-grip-1498726544 (visited Oct
10, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable).
68 See Steven Lee Myers and Ellen Barry, Putin Reclaims Crimea for Russia and
Bitterly Denounces the West (NY Times, Mar 18, 2014), online at http://www
.nytimes.com/2014/03/19/world/europe/ukraine.html?mcubz=0 (visited Oct 10, 2017)
(Perma archive unavailable).
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arbitrary power in so many totalitarian regimes. The best way to
fight them, moreover, is not to appeal to a frayed and tattered
progressivism, but to reaffirm the dominance of liberty, property,
limited government, and the rule of law, as properly understood
in the classical liberal tradition.
CONCLUSION
In this short Essay, I have tried to pour some cold water over
the modern claims for the intellectual dominance of liberal constitutionalism. On first inspection, there seems much to like in
liberal constitutionalism. But on closer look, the clear weaknesses
of that position are legion. The most important of these is the gap
in the specification of the individual rights that it seeks to defend.
GHV have not written a defense of traditional limited government. Instead they have penned a defense of the wrong set of
rights, which is ultimately unstable, both for the economic stagnation it engenders and for its heavy reliance on unbounded administrative interventions that, for all their procedural formalities, are inconsistent with the rule of law.
Indeed, that critical concept can be read in dramatically different ways. The thin version of the doctrine contains no substantive commitments and is satisfied by having neutral judges
administering internally consistent rules generated by a supposedly benign combination of popular democratic will backed by
administrative expertise. That version will disintegrate in the
face of constant and uncontrollable political pressures. It should
therefore be emphatically rejected in favor of the strong conception of the rule of law that ties that conception to a particular
substantive vision that features limited government, strong private property rights, and freedom of contract, subject to the limitations set out above. The differences between these two systems
is enormous. The seeds for the destruction of the fashionable versions of liberal constitutionalism lie in its weak substrate of substantive rights. Stemming today’s massive unease will not come
from an uncritical defense of an outmoded theory that rests on
progressive principles. It lies in making strong substantive commitments to the classical liberal position that is all too often overlooked and deprecated today.

